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 1 
Reggae borderzones, reggae graveyards 
Bob Marley fandom in Bali 
 
Introduction1 
The road from Bali’s international airport to the island’s most renowned tourist area, 
Kuta Beach, leads past a number of establishments claiming affiliation to reggae 
music and Rastafarianism in large, appropriately coloured billboards. A sign outside 
a tee shirt shop bears the words RASTA MANIA within a green, yellow and red 
border, and a stick figure caricaturing negritude, the logo of this clothing label. In the 
window display hangs a tee shirt, and upon it Bob Marley’s wizened face. His lips 
pinch a cone-shaped spliff, and he squints behind a veil of airbrushed smoke. A lean-
to sign on the sidewalk outside Apache Bar announce REGGAE BANDS 
NIGHTLY. This barn of coconut wood and thatch nestles behind Wendy’s Ice 
Cream Parlour and Chi Chi’s Mexican Bar. Its timber walls emulate a rustic, 
spaghetti Western aesthetic and are adorned with portraits of native Americans. In 
addition to the reggae bands, nightly, Apache bar unites young Japanese women with 
local ‘guides’.2 
 
In other coastal resorts around the island, one finds other bars devoted to the nightly 
reproduction of reggae music. Sanur has Mango Sindhu, where Magic Voice strikes 
up at 9pm, and middle aged European couples take timidly to the dance floor in a 
valiant effort to dance off their dinner of pizza, chips and Bintang beer. Legend is a 
lonely bar in sleepy Candi Dasa. There, young men from all over the rocky precinct 
of Karangasem come to perform, to dance beneath the bar’s feature Bob Marley 
mural to a disco-versions of Get Up Stand Up (For Your Rights). Lovina on the 
island’s north coast has Malibu, which does a roaring trade every Saturday night 
when the reggae band from Denpasar is in town. 
 
A Balinese reggae scene first emerged in the early 1990s, and centred on a beachside 
bar called Bruna, located in one of the island’s man tourist areas, Kuta. Every 
Saturday night, a local Bob Marley and the Wailers covers band, Legend, played at 
Bruna. This event attracted a sizeable local fandom in which reggae was associated 
with an inclusiveness which, like preceding youth scenes which also centred on Kuta 
Beach, contested demonisation of the West in elite Balinese discourses of identity.3 
 
By 1996, the Bruna bar had lost its license and the reggae scene had lost its core 
‘turf’. This early scene then metamorphosed into a later scene (as I shall distinguish 
the two scenes throughout this paper), and came to centre on a less regular event - an 
annual Festival. This Festival was a contest among bands, convened by the Bali 
Tourism Academy (Sekolah Tinggi Pariwisata: STP), the first of which took place in 
1994. Local reggae bands were invited to compete for prize money, and the  
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opportunity to secure contracts with renowned live music venues in tourist areas, 
hence reorienting the Balinese reggae scene toward an event where bands vied for 
contracts with tourist bars. 
 
This article pursues questions about reggae’s curious transformation from a genre of 
music associated with Rastafarianism, a form of resistance devised by the slum 
dwellers of Kingston to protest colonial exploitation, to one which appeared to revel 
in and understand itself by looking to the tourist gaze as a mirror. Certainly, in the 
global marketing of Marley’s music, transformations had taken place prior to its 
arrival in Bali. Nevertheless, as Balinese punks later demonstrated, it was possible 
for local youth to excorporate recuperated global styles, and use them to generate 
revisions of New Order official and elite Balinese discourses of identity (Baulch, 
2002). 4 This prompts the question of what may have prevented Balinese reggae 
musicians from undertaking similar appropriations. The fact that, in the 1990s, 
alternate, non-official articulations of Balinese-ness were re-empowered in the local 
press only reinforces the urgency of this question, which I pursue in reverse, as it 
were – not through participant observation, for when I began to research this essay in 
1996 the scene was already in its dying days. At the Balinese reggae scene’s death 
bed, then, I attempted something of an excavation, and this essay is based on 
interviews with scene participants in which I urged them to both recollect an earlier, 
Bruna-based scene and characterise the later, Festival-oriented scene of the mid 
1990s.  
 
This essay begins with a review of reggae music’s internationalisation as a prelude to 
my account of how participants in the Balinese reggae scene uniformly associated 
reggae music with tropical zones, tourist destinations and the beach. I attempt to 
locate reggae’s apparent ‘touristification’ in Bali within the context of the 
internationalisation of reggae, and particularly of the music of Bob Marley and the 
Wailers, as already widely examined (Cushman 1991; King, 1988; Regis, 1988). I 
note how, when viewed in the context of these scholarly writings about reggae’s 
internationalisation, Bob Marley fandom in Bali appears divorced from its 
Rastafarian, anti-colonial message. Furthermore, when viewed through a different 
lens, that of local Balinese and Indonesian identity discourses, it becomes clear that 
such labels scarcely contain the ways in which Balinese Marley fandoms were 
expressed, particularly among members of the earlier scene. Firstly, there is evidence 
to suggest that Bob Marley’s international image fed into barely veiled criticisms of 
the New Order government. Secondly, once the aforementioned Bruna scene is 
positioned vis-à-vis local elite discourses of identity, it appears as a borderzone and a 
ludic fringe where young local men contested dominant notions of Balineseness, 
hence conforming to scholarly characterisations of Rastafarianism’s ‘original’ 
message. Based on interviewees’ recollections, I draw attention to similarities 
between the Balinese reggae scene of the early 1990s, Hetherington’s (1997: 28) 
discussions of the role of Foucauldian heterotopia in processes of social change, and 
Warren’s (1998a: 102) characterisations Balinese borderzones. 
 
Finally, I explore the impact of state deregulation policies upon these ‘ludic fringes’ 
at Kuta. Specifically, I argue below that reggae’s rationalisation in Bali may be seen 
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as evidence of the power of national centres and nation states to determine how 
people interact with global media products, such as Bob Marley and the Wailers’ 
songs, by imposing developmentalist discourses and market logics, transforming the 
spaces in which youth seek to revise and contest dominant discourses of identity on 
the local level. 
 
International reggae: co-relations and routinisations 
“The presence of reggae artists on the international scene has been a self-
perpetuating Garveyist prophesy” (Potash, 1997: xxviii). 
 
On the event of his departure from Jamaica in 1916, Marcus Garvey is said to have 
urged his supporters to “[l]ook to Africa for the crowning of a black King, he shall 
be the Redeemer” (Barrett, 1977: 67). Two years earlier, Garvey and Amy Ashwood 
had formed the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Kingston, 
which championed black pride and sought to unite a fragmented black diaspora 
under a single banner: “One God, one aim, one destiny!”  
 
There is a direct link between Marcus Garvey and the emergence of Rastafarianism 
in Jamaica. In 1930, Haile Selassie, or Ras Tafari, was crowned King of Ethiopia. 
Garvey’s followers in Jamaica understood this as a fulfilment of his prophesy that 
their emancipation lay the coming of a black king in Africa (Cushman, 1991: 31). 
Barrett attributes the emergence of Jamaican Rastafarianism to four ministers – 
Leonard Howell, Joseph Hibbert, Archibald Dunkley and Robert Hinds - who 
formed separate groups, all “claiming to have received the revelation that the newly 
crowned King of Ethiopia was the Messiah”, and began recruiting Garveyites in the 
slums of Kingston who, by 1934, formed a “solid nucleus of Rastafarians” (Barrett, 
1977: 82). 5 
 
The Rastafarians revered Garvey, but their ‘dread’ful aesthetic (Hebdige, 1973) and 
inherent disorder (Lewis, 1994) was quite a departure from the Garveyites’ fondness 
for the clean-cut military dress style and postures as displayed at UNIA mass rallies 
in the 1920s. Like the Garveyites, they identified as members of an African diaspora. 
But further to this, they cast Jamaica as Babylon to Ethiopia’s Zion, and set about to 
unveil Jamaica’s truly Babylonian nature by fetishising their alienated condition, 
thus inviting stigma. Their dreads accentuated and exhibited this alien-ness and, in 
Hebdige’s view, suggests that the Rastafarians were “determined to reverse that 
insidious process whereby ideology perpetuates itself in disguised form (as ‘common 
sense’ etc) by evolving more radical and effective techniques of cultural 
appropriation” (Hebdige, 1973: 2).  
 
In the context of this essay, Hebdige’s (1973) account is particularly useful for his 
lucid interpretations of Rastafarian dress style as an important subcultural strategy, as 
well as for his cross cultural comparisons. In Reggae, Rasta and Rudies (1973) he 
describes Rastafarian ‘dread’ as an expression of alien-ness and a subcultural 
strategy with which to menace. In Subculture, the meaning of style (1979) he 
contrasts the Rastafarians use of ‘dread’ to dislocate from Jamaican-ness with the 
English skinheads’ tendencies to embrace their working class roots. By contrast, he 
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argues, English punks appropriated Rastafarian dread and developed a ‘white 
ethnicity’, which ‘gestured nowhere’. As the Rastas with their dreadlocks, the punks 
used this white ethnicity to accentuate and illuminate the conditions of their 
alienation.  This punk-Rasta alliance shows how oppressed groups can wrest power 
from an alienating environment by fetishising alien-ness.  
 
Demonstrating the black roots of contemporary white subcultures has indeed been a 
feature of a number of CCCS (‘Birmingham School’) analyses of the late 1970s. 
Chambers (1975: 161), for example, argues that as outsiders, black working class 
people “were in a better position than the white working class to produce a positive 
and coherent expression of their oppression.” Such expressions, in his view, were 
subsequently taken up, redefined and emasculated by white, working class 
performers and musicians (such as Elvis Presley). Further, he asserts that the 
“oppositional” values “embedded” in black culture and black music “served to 
symbolise and symptomatise the contradictions and tensions played out in British 
working class youth subcultures” (Chambers, 1975: 165). Hebdige takes this line of 
argument further, and contends that, just as punks appropriated elements of 
Rastafarian style to effect alien-ness (Hebdige, 1979: 64), so did English skinheads 
draw on West Indian immigrant cultures to express a lumpen identity: 
 
It was not only by congregating on the all-white football terraces but through 
consorting with West Indians at the local youth clubs and on street corners, by 
copying their mannerisms, their curses, dancing to their music, that the 
skinheads magically recovered the lost sense of working class community. 
Hebdige, 1979: 56 
 
In this article, I aim to demonstrate how, in spite of its role in bringing 
Rastafarianism to world attention, reggae music was not inherently subcultural, 
resistant or of the oppressed -  characterisations suggestive of a sonic essentialism. 
Rather, reggae codes’ discursive construction renders them amoebic and malleable, 
as becomes clear in the genres’ global mediations. Indeed, reggae’s recuperable 
dimensions have been thoroughly explored in a number of accounts of reggae’s 
internationalisation. Some writers have argued that reggae’s laid back nuances made 
the genre ripe for appropriation by a global tourism industry (Cushman, 1991). 
Others that as reggae became popular in the North, song lyrics were re-interpreted 
according to North American middle class progressive norms, which subsequently 
came to define reggae practice in and outside the Carribbean (Regis, 1988; King, 
1988).  
 
Below, I argue that similar appropriations indeed become clear in the Balinese case, 
and highlight the need to refrain from romanticising reggae by assuming its 
revolutionary connotations, as did former Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael 
Manley, when he referred to reggae as the “spontaneous sound of a local 
revolutionary impulse” (in O’Gormon, 1997: 256), and Dick Hebdige (1973: 26) 
who has proclaimed that because it “reversed the established pattern of pop music”, 
reggae is therefore “inherently subversive”. By the latter half of the 1990s, to be a 
Balinese reggae musician was to aspire to the employ of tourist bars and hotels, 
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where musicians were paid to cover Marley and the Wailers’ songs because they 
were inherently Balinese - peaceful and relaxing - in line with tourists’ expectations 
of a Third World holiday destination. In such a context, surely reggae did not 
“escape the limitations of a Western aesthetic” (Hebdige, 1973: 26). Nor do I 
contend, however, that Balinese reggae practices, although rationalised, ought to be 
characterised as inherently ‘recuperated’. Marley-related symbology was drawn into 
relatively distinct global tourism and Balinese populist discourses alike, and 
individual reggae enthusiasts experienced reggae fandom in multiple ways. 
Sometimes they embraced it as model, happy-go-lucky Balinese youths, hence 
welcoming tourists by identifying Bali with the image of a tropical holiday 
destination. Other times, they embraced Bob Marley for his capacity to liberate them 
from official, New Order discourses of identity, particularly for the peculiar ways in 
which these official discourses were expressed as they engaged with the Balinese 
tourism industry. Balinese reggae practices therefore attest to the refractive effects of 
reggae’s internationalisation, and hence the genre’s polysemic capacities. 
 
The globalisation of Bob Marley fandom 
Originally, reggae music did not have firm political allegiances. As Fergusson (1997: 
52) notes, it was only after reggae artist Bob Marley’s group The Wailers “became 
the first popular Jamaican group to make Rastafari philosophies and Rasta drumming 
the main thrust of their music”, that increasing numbers of Jamaican musicians also 
converted to Rastafarianism, and reggae became the primary medium for expressing 
their beliefs. Later, in 1972, the Wailers signed with Island Records, a London-based 
label owned by a (white) Jamaican Chris Blackwell. Between that date and Marley’s 
death in 1981, The Wailers produced ten albums with Island, all of which went gold 
(Fergusson, 1997: 52). 
 
Marley’s success was politically significant in several respects. Firstly, it elevated 
the role of Jamaican music in the context of an international music industry 
dominated by musicians from first world, developed countries. Secondly, his lyrics 
articulated Rastafarian concerns – concerns of poor people, black people, slum-
dwellers and colonised people. As a result, as King and Jensen note, Marley’s 
success inspired the expansion of Rastafarianism within Jamaica (King and Jensen, 
1996: 18). Further, on an international level, Marley’s reggae brought 
Rastafarianism to world attention, and his music operated as an expressive vehicle 
for marginalised and underclass people everywhere (see O’Gormon, 1997). 
 
Other accounts of the internationalisation of Jamaican reggae are more concerned 
with the question of cultural appropriation. For example, Regis (1994,1988) and 
King (1998) describe how reggae music, particularly that of Jimmy Cliff and Bob 
Marley, became popular among North American university students. Cushman 
(1991: 36) and King (1998: 39) both allude to the important role of Chris Blackwell, 
the President of Island Records, who signed Bob Marley, in the promotion and 
marketing of reggae in the US. Cushman observes how “[a]s the cultural 
entrepreneur Blackwell had realised when he marketed the music, Rasta codes, styles 
of dress, use of ganja, dreadlocks, etc., would create the social dissonance necessary 
to attract the attention of potential audiences.” Similarly, in King’s (1998: 49) view, 
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the forms of reggae that were marketed to American college students and young 
Europeans retained a politically radical content but were stylistically altered in order 
to appeal to white middle class audiences. 
 
Regis (1994, 1988), however, contends that to begin with reggae was not politically 
radical as commonly alleged, but that American audiences read revolutionary content 
into the genre. In Regis view, following reggae’s popularisation in the US, 
individualist values were grafted onto the code, erasing its ‘traditional’ orientation 
toward balance and collectivism. Firstly, reggae musicians such as Bob Marley came 
to be revered as superstars, increasingly distanced from their audiences. Secondly, 
oppositional  themes, with which middle class progressives could identify,  began to 
dominate reggae lyrics as “dichomotisation songs”, which divided “the world into 
the virtuous ‘progressives’ and the wretched ‘establishment’” (Regis, 1994: 46). 
Further, he argues, this middle class American reinterpretation was sold back to 
Jamaican enthusiasts, hence typifying cultural imperialism by re-exportation, 
whereby the developed world appropriates the cultural products of the developing 
world, then re-exports them in their altered state (Regis, 1988: 67).6 
 
Balinese reggae was also exclusively focussed on Bob Marley and the Wailers’ 
songs and images of Marley himself. In Bali, one rarely saw images of any other 
reggae artist, nor heard their music, and enthusiasm for reggae in Bali may be 
described as part of the global Marley fandom mentioned above. Certainly, the role 
of Chris Blackwell in the recontextualisation of Marley’s music in its passage to Bali 
must also have been pivotal. However, the way Balinese musicians of the later scene 
described their reggae-related practices in the context of the local tourism industry 
typifies neither expressive vehicle for marginalised people O’Gormon (1997) 
discusses, nor the re-exported, culturally imperialist, revolutionary content songs that 
Regis mentions. Rather, it echoed the example that introduces Cushman’s article. He 
cites the use of voice-overs inflected with a heavy Jamaican accent and distinctly 
reggae jingles became common in a number of American beer advertisements, one of 
which offered a chance to win prizes ranging from a holiday to Jamaica to “a varied 
assortment of cultural kitsch emblazoned with Rastafarian themes” (Cushman, 1991: 
17). Setting out to explore how a revolutionary, anti-capitalist code ended up as part 
of an advertisement for American beer, concludes that: 
 
[T]he appropriation of reggae represents a particular case of a more general 
process of what Russell Berman refers to as the ‘routinisation of charismatic 
modernism’ in which charismatic challenges to modernity from the realm of 
culture are increasingly diffused” (ibid: 38).  
 
Reggae’s presence in the Balinese tourism industry may inspire similar enquiries. 
 
My Beautiful Kuta 
In the early to mid- 1990s, a Balinese regionalism began to emerge in the wake of 
important changes in the tourism industry. The central governments deregulation 
packages, vigorous promotion of Indonesia as a tourist destination, relaxed visa 
regulations, the growing importance of tourism in the domestic economy, and the 
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expansion of the tourism industry worldwide all contributed to the Balinese tourism 
industry’s growth from the late 1980s. The boom led to the effective scrapping of the 
initial concept for the development of Balinese tourism industry, which place strict 
limits on resort development, and its replacement with a more liberal, less regulative 
approach, locally referred to as ‘mass tourism’ (see Aditjondro, 1995; McCarthy, 
1994).   
 
Images by Balinese cartoonists run in the local press reveal that this nascent 
regionalist discourse, which contested accelerated development, commonly attributed 
to Balinese people an authentic ‘low’-ness, in contrast to the (perceived) flashy, 
greedy, be-suited Jakartanese investors who allegedly enjoyed much of the tourism 
boom’s spoils (Warren, 1998). Notably, in the articulations of Balinese identity that 
monopolised public discourse in the seventies and eighties, Bali and the West, but 
not Bali and Jakarta, had been diametrically opposed. But over the course of the 
1990s, Jakarta indeed began to assume the West’s former role as Other which serves 
to define the local self, and a ‘regionalist discourse’ began to emerge. 
 
In spite of the clear Babylonian inferences of the way in which Jakarta was being 
constituted in the budding regionalist discourse, reggae’s anti-colonial message 
appeared to have little resonance among Balinese enthusiasts. Rather, and quite at 
odds with a prevailing regionalism, when I arrived in Bali in 1996, reggae was being 
played to assure tourists of Bali’s inherent peace. In interviews conducted at the 
beginning of that year, reggae musicians were most optimistic about their futures as 
cover bands in tourism bars, and Gus They’s comments typify the attitude of many 
of his contemporaries: 
 
It’s easy to find a job in a bar if you are a reggae band because tourists really 
like reggae. That’s why, from 1994, we decided that Fatamorgana would be a 
reggae band. We play in hotels because it is really hard to record in Bali, there 
are no studios, or people who are expert at promoting a band. That’s why we 
are better off playing on hotels. We seek a name for our band on the (festival) 
stage, then hope that on the basis of our performance at the festival the hotels 
will offer us gigs. 
Interview, 10 June, 1996. 
 
As They’s comments suggest, this was more than mere opportunism. It was an 
identity practice, for it influenced the way in which they perceived themselves as 
Balinese. Firstly, in the view of participants in both earlier and later reggae scenes, 
playing reggae covers reinforced Bali’s image as a tropical, beachside destination. 
Rudi, who sang with the first reggae band to be formed in Bali, and was central to the 
establishment of Bruna as a reggae venue, recalled that “Bruna had potential because 
it was by the beach, had a tropical feeling like in Jamaica, so we painted it red, 
yellow and green and people understood that there was reggae there” (Interview, 15 
June, 1998). Similarly, Agung Joni recounted thus: “My friend Wayan went to 
Jamaica, to the Caribbean, and found out that there was reggae everywhere there. He 
thought it was strange that there was no reggae in Bali, even though it’s a tropical 
place too. That’s good for the reggae music business.” Musicians with the Marley 
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cover band Soul Rebel which, in 1998, had a contract to play twice a week at All 
Stars Café in Kuta, told me that “Reggae is big here and not in Jakarta. That’s 
because Bali is close to the beach [sic.] and reggae is associated with the beach, 
relaxation, the beach” (Interview, 16 July, 1998). 
 
Secondly, in the view of musicians, playing reggae covers confirmed Balinese 
people’s alleged relaxed and peaceful proclivities. Soul Rebel musicians told me that 
“we like listening to reggae because it is relaxed, peaceful….” (Interview, 6 July, 
1998). Notably, on this point, reggae musicians contrasted reggae’s inherent 
Balinese-ness with thrash metal’s inherent violence and foreign-ness. Riots had taken 
place at a Metallica concert in Jakarta in 1993, and in the mid 1990s, in the context 
of thrash metal’s official demonisation, growing numbers of thrash metal bands 
formed in Bali. Said They:   
 
Thrash music is not appropriate for Bali because it is heavy and promotes 
violence. We Balinese are peaceful, relaxed. Reggae songs can really be 
enjoyed, you can listen to the lyrics, the melody, isn’t it better that way?” 
(Interview with the author, 10 June, 1996). 
 
Rather than appropriated and routinised, however, I contend that the later Balinese 
reggae scene may be more aptly described as rationalised and hence 
recontextualised. Indeed, the fact that by 1996, the Balinese reggae scene comprised 
a contest, organised by the island’s Tourism Academy, and sponsored by ‘big 
capital’ tourism ventures, such as Hackett Bungee Jump, Waterbom Park and Bali 
Hai cruises (interview, Soul Rebel) is suggestive of rationalisation, as is the fact that 
reggae musicians associated playing reggae with as exchange value on the tourism 
industry’s labour market. Further, consensus among enthusiasts that playing Marley 
covers was about the beach, relaxation and getting a regular hotel gig suggests that in 
Bali, reggae-related symbols were not merely commodities defused of charisma like 
the Rastafarian symbols Cushman discusses, but had been invested with new 
meanings within the global tourism industry. Relying on Jamaica’s renown as a 
tourist destination and pre-existing stereotypical depictions of ‘non-whiteness’, in the 
Balinese tourism industry, ‘Rasta’ symbolised beachside destinations, hedonism, 
abandon and a Jah Jah Binks kind of innocence, as it did in other beachside tourist 
destinations all over the (developing) world.7 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that 
the sole original lyric, written in Bahasa Indonesia, I was able to attain from a reggae 
musician in mid-1996 is an ode to Kuta Beach.  
 
Walking on the white sand at dusk/ Relieves my tired heart/ Around me, the 
spray of the waves/ Enticing me to daydream 
From behind the clouds/ A ray of light calms my soul/ will all this continue to 
be/ will my beautiful Kuta be preserved 
My beautiful Kuta, even your sunset smiles/ My beautiful Kuta will I see you 
again 
My Beautiful Kuta, by vocalist for Fatamorgana, Gus They8 
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Reggae’s commodification by the tourism industry appears akin to Hebdige’s 
characterisations of the process of  recuperation, by which “the fractured order is 
repaired and the subculture is incorporated as a diverting spectacle within the 
dominant mythology, as ‘folk devil’, as other, as enemy” (Hebdige, 1997: 131). 
Here, however, I wish to refrain from such judgements, reminded of Sarah 
Thornton’s (1997: 201) charges that, “diverted by the task of puncturing and 
contesting dominant ideologies”, the Birmingham tradition has “overpoliticised 
leisure and at the same time ignored the subtle relations of power at play within it.”  
 
Indeed, Balinese reggae practices included the kinds of subtle power plays that the 
notion of recuperation fails to grasp. It would certainly be misleading to cast 
Balinese reggae musicians as victims of capitalism and development, for could be 
argued that reggae’s rationalisation empowered them to pursue careers as reggae 
musicians, which freed them from other more mundane options, such as 
unemployment, civil service, hospitality. Moreover, as I discuss below, Bob 
Marley’s image and music resonated in different Balinese contexts in a variety of 
ways too, hence attesting to the fragmentary capacity of global mediations and the 
polysemic nature of localisation processes. In other contexts in Bali, for example, 
reggae symbols did seem to contain the “progressive” or “radical” elements that 
Regis (1988) and King (1998) identify in the reggae that became popular among 
North American university students. Further, there is also evidence that the survival 
of these progressive elements in Bali was not due to cultural imperialism by re-
exportation, but to their resonance with pre-existing local political traditions.  
 
Marley as folk hero 
As well as being a common feature in tourist bars, Bob Marley’s face could also be 
seen in public spaces in the city of Denpasar, which attracts few tourists. Along with 
Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Indonesian folk 
singer Iwan Fals, Bob Marley’s face is among those most commonly stuck to the 
back of windows of bemos (public minibuses). Stalls line the outside wall of the 
barn-like building that houses Sanglah marketplace, and specialise in stickers and 
posters. Here, Apache chiefs are absent, as Iwan Fals, Mbak Mega and Sukarno are 
in Kuta. Alongside them, Bob Marley no longer symbolises hedonism in a beachside 
tourist haven. He is now a folk hero, someone who stands up for the little people. In 
these Balinese contexts, Bob Marley’s image now does seem to support O’Gormon’s 
(1997) abovementioned contention that marginalized people all over the world 
referred to Bob Marley in protesting the conditions of their oppression. Clearly then, 
the dichotomisation songs Regis (1988) recognised in international reggae resonated 
not only with American progressives, but in Bali, too.  
 
By the mid-1990s, Megawati Soekarnoputri’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI: 
Indonesian Democratic Party) was fast amassing supporters in Bali, who cast 
Suharto as the antipathy of his predecessor. More than two decades after his death, 
Megawati’s father, Indonesia’s first President Sukarno, also became a potent 
symbol of a pan-ethnic, pan-religious, popular discontent with Suharto’s rule.9 
Warren (1994: 1) describes how “the Balinese public has been inclined to accept 
the government party (Golkar) line and enthusiastically support the rhetoric of the 
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national philosophy, Pancasila, in principle – though never without critical 
attention to divergence in practice….” After the 1992 general election, however, 
she observed that 
 
Popular perceptions of the New Order government [began] to shift…as 
indicated by the growth in support for the opposition PDI party in the 
1992 election. The PDI doubled its vote province-wide to 20%, but 
actually reached 40% in areas such as the village of my research, which 
sits on the fringe of one of the cinderella zones of development.(ibid: 1) 
 
 Marley’s place alongside Sukarno at Denpasar’s Sanglah market reveals a telling, if 
not explicit, association, underscored by Made Arthana’s assertion that “the 
perception of Rasta here is that it is of the people, of the little people”, is also 
reminiscent of PDI populism, as is  Agung Joni’s version of reggae’s passage to Bali 
and its local appeal: 
 
Bob Marley spoke a message which people could hear. About love, about God, 
and the need for a united humanity. Sometimes people like to proclaim their 
national identity, but Rastafarians are one race, one blood, one love. This is 
what I like about reggae. 
Agung Joni. Interview, 16 March, 1996 
 
Marley’s status as folk hero appears to contradict Balinese Marley cover musicians 
of the later scene who complied with accelerated tourism development, and may be 
read as a faint echo of an earlier scene which was territorially rooted in Kuta – a 
disorderly, inclusive scene in which East/West, rich/poor, exterior/interior 
dichotomies were broken down. This earlier scene may be compared to both 
Foucauldian heterotopia – “counter sites… in which… all other real sites that can be 
found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted 
(Foucault, 1986), and the Balinese borderzones Warren (1998a 102) describes as 
“ambivalent and ambiguous site of identity construction arising at the meeting places 
between equally complex spaces of past/present, tradition/ modernity, East/West.” 
 
The Bruna borderzone 
Elite Balinese discourses of identity during the 1970s and 1980s cast Balineseness as 
the West’s opposite, particularly by “defining Balinese identity in terms of 
opposition to and threats from tourism” (Vickers, 1989: 176). The perception of 
tourism in dominant Balinese identity discourses as a force of cultural imperialism 
directly implicated local youth culture as a potential inroad for Western cultural 
pollutants, due to the perceived Western proclivities of global youth culture. In the 
mid 1970s, Balinese intellectuals authored a report in which they expressed concern 
that “that “...the way young foreign tourists are seen to mix freely has been quickly 
imitated by our youth...(among whom)...the standard of decency is getting very low” 
(in Universitas Udayana and Francillon, 1975: 745).  
 
The Balinese reggae scene can be traced to the coming together of a Bali-based, 
Javanese Rastafarian and reggae musician, Rudi, and a man from Jamaica called 
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Sam. In the late 1980s, Rudi returned with his English wife and their child to live in 
England. Rudi frequently busked at Camden market, playing Rolling Stones and 
Dylan covers, often using guitar and mouth organ in typical Dylan style. 
Incongruously, however, his hair was dreaded, not because he was a Rastafarian, but 
because he claimed that cutting his hair gave him a headache. The dreads 
nevertheless brought him into contact with a local Rastafarian scene. Soon, he 
adopted the Rastafarian lifestyle and beliefs: 
 
One day a guy with really long dreads went by. A Jamaican guy. He said ‘Hey, 
dreadlocks, natty dread,” then he said, “You follow me. What are you doing 
busking here? Follow me.” He took me to a place where there were all these 
Rastafarian people drumming and chanting. It was full of smoke, everybody 
was smoking. After that, I never played rock and roll again…. I entered the 
Rastafarian religion. I used to really like eating steak and sate, and I gave up 
all that and became vegetarian. 
Rudi. Interview, 15 June, 1998 
 
By the time I met Rudi in 1998, the strength of his piety had waned, but his 
dreadlocks remained. One thick pipe of matted hair arced rigidly under his chin, 
framing paper-y skin, stretched taut across a delicate jaw. He told me that: 
 
After returning from England, around 1989, I met up with Sam and we formed 
a reggae band together, called Jamasyah. There was no reggae at Bruna bar 
at that time, and it was very quiet. We injected some life into it. We took over 
the place once a week, as well as the catering. We printed tickets, and did our 
own promotions….(ibid) 
 
The role of Jamasyah’s performances at Bruna in drawing increasing numbers of 
punters to the bar was corroborated by other musicians, but interviewees more 
commonly referred to the establishment of Legend band and their regular gig at 
Bruna, which took place after Jamasyah’s dissolution, as the event which inspired the 
formation of a local reggae scene. Notably, reggae musicians’ remembered the 
reggae scene of the early 1990s as an authentic core which held sway over musicians 
from the metropolis. In this way, Bruna was remembered as a site of pilgrimage, with 
nationwide resonance. 
 
Bruna influenced bands from Jakarta, like Slank who, after visiting Bali began 
to insert reggae riffs into their songs.(Gus Martin. Interview with the auhtor, 3 
May, 1998) 
 
Many musicians who visited here to check out the scene returned to Jakarta 
and began to write songs in Indonesian, but with a reggae beat.(Rudi. 
Interview with the author, 15 June 1998) 
 
Many Jakartanese musicians looked for inspiration here. Slank, for example, 
were heavily influenced by their experiences in Bali. They became interested in 
reggae music. (Cahyadi. Interview with the author, 8 July, 1998) 
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Jakarta-based rock band Slank’s song, Bali Bagus, included on the album 
Kampungan, sheds light on the nature of this centre-periphery relationship: 
 
Thank you my Bali, for your culture and your nature/Thank you for your 
beautiful girls/And the strength of your Balinese arak 
Watching the sunset at the beach takes away my weariness/Bathing in the sea 
eases my stress/Watching your girls dance is a sight for sore eyes/The night air 
of Kuta takes away my anger 
For a moment I forget the conflicts of my ego/Living in Jakarta, full of 
rules/Where saying or wearing what you want is forbidden/Where people 
whisper and gossip if I hang out with whomever I please 
Slank, 1992 
 
The depiction of Kuta Beach in this song is similar to that of Gus They’s My 
Beautiful Kuta. But unlike Gus They’s song, the Slank track does not forewarn 
against the potential loss of a paradise, and merely celebrates their experience of the 
beach as an innocent, unregulated realm – a welcome contrast to the highly regulated 
nature of their metropolitan home. To them, Bali was the beach, a place of hedonism, 
and they experienced it as tourists.  
 
Far from protesting the Jakartanese experience of Bali, local reggae enthusiasts 
embraced it. As evident in the above-cited comments, local reggae enthusiasts took 
pride in the influence of their beach culture over the Jakarta rock scene. This 
supports Balinese authorities’ contention that tourism “reinforced the sense of 
cultural identity and pride of the people of Bali” (Picard, 1990: 43). But local elites 
are unlikely to cite influence of the Bruna reggae scene over Jakarta-based rock 
bands as an instance of cultural preservation due to tourism, for the Bruna scene was 
a far cry from any elite discourses on authentic Balineseness, which rarely reify 
arak-drinking as a favourable aspect of Balinese masculinity. Indeed, the way in 
which enthusiasts recalled the Bruna scene suggests that the bar was able to serve as 
a kind of free zone, where behaviour could be cut loose from the demands of cultural 
preservation. This further suggests that tourists and locals may have had quite 
different understandings of reggae’s significance in the context of tourism. In 
contrast to the dominant local discourses of identity, which sought to uphold 
Baliness as unique, reggae enthusiasts pinned the authenticity of the Bruna scene to a 
cosmopolitan inclusiveness and the dissolution of racial and socio-economic 
divisions. There, the experience of marginality or Otherness was exacerbated through 
the liberal use of ganja. 
 
Bruna was an easygoing place. Anyone was welcome there. (Agung Alit and 
Ngurah Karyadi. interview with the author, 25 June, 1998) 
 
There were all sorts at Bruna, beach boys, fishermen, and even millionaires. 
(Gus Martin. interview with the author, 3 May, 1998) 
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Japanese, Americans, Australians, black people, everybody came together 
there, that was the good thing about the Bruna reggae club. (Rudi . interview 
with the author, 15 June, 1998) 
 
You could smoke joints freely at Bruna, that’s why so many people went there. 
(Soul Rebel, interview with the author, 16 July, 1998) 
 
These reggae enthusiasts did not appear to be concerned, as were Balinese academics 
cited above, that their “standard of decency [was] getting very low” (in Francillon 
and Universitas Udayana, 1975: 745). Indeed, some recent discussions of Balinese 
identity intimate that the singularity of public/official discourse during the 1970s and 
1980s did not represent consent, but rather papered over more critical and innovative 
formulations. Warren (1998) , for example, cites Bali as a prime instance of the kind 
of cultural borderzone in which “invented” dichotomies, such as past/present, 
East/West, traditional/modern, converge, giving rise to ambiguous and ambivalent 
meanings. As such, she argues, these cultural borderzones become important sites for 
identity construction and revision. In a similar vein, adotoping the Foucauldian 
(1986) term, heterotopia, Hetherington (1997: 107-8) has argued that marginal space 
assumes “social centrality” in the formation and performance of expressive identities. 
Like Warren’s borderzones, Hetherington’s margins “are not things pushed to the 
edge, they can also be in-between spaces, spaces of traffic, right at the centre of 
things”. Warren presents the example of the important role of ‘traditional’ Balinese 
dalangs (shadow puppeteers) in identity revisions, for they, too, occupy one such 
borderzone which marks the meeting of the this- and other-worldly. 
 
Warren’s  (1998: 101) conclusion that “[i]n Bali, the ambivalent and heteroglossic 
magic-real cultural domain is profoundly connected to the Balinese constructions of 
identity and difference” does not apply to the reggae scene in the early nineties. That 
is, the Magic Real domain, niskala, did not feature in Balinese reggae enthusiasts’ 
recollections of the scene in the early 1990s. But the way in which they described the 
space in which a reggae scene first emerged is nonetheless similar to the borderzones 
she describes. 
 
Above, I differentiated between two different local conceptions of Bob Marley. In 
beachside tourist destinations across the world, he signaled hedonism, peace and 
relaxation, and indeed Balinese enthusiasts uniformly subscribed to this view. In 
certain Balinese contexts, however, to the very same enthusiasts, far from being a 
hedonist, Marley, like Iwan Fals, Mbak Mega and Sukarno, represented justice and 
courage; somebody who stood up for the ‘little people’. Therefore, like that of 
Warren’s dalang (puppetmaster), practices associated with reggae fandom in Bali in 
the early 1990s were similarly heteroglossic. That is, as tourists flocked to hear 
reggae bands play, and locals revelled in the nascent reggae scene, different readings 
of reggae-related symbolism converged at Bruna bar. Furthermore, the location of 
Bruna bar by the beach appeared to blur the distinction between exteriority and 
interiority, which was also aided by the fact that, up until 1995, entry was free. In 
short, according to the above-cited comments, anyone and everyone ebbed and 
flowed through Bruna’s doors, and as local and tourist understandings of 
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‘reggaeness’ converged, so did other, parallel, dichotomies: East/West; 
centre/periphery; rich/poor. In this way, Bruna indeed recalls Warren’s borderzones, 
for it harboured experiences of Marley fandom suggestive of local critical responses 
to New Order developmentalism, and a global space on the fringes of local elite 
constructions of the Balinese identity.  
 
A number of cultural geographers (Keith and Pile, 1993; Bell and Valentine, 1995; 
Pile and Thrift, 1995; Shields, 1991) have also drawn attention to the importance of 
margins in cultural critique and acts of resistance. Hetherington (1997) provides a 
thoroughgoing critique of a tendency among such writers to valorise the margins by 
depicting them as sanctuaries of transgression, and oases of carnivalism. He explores 
the role of heterotopia, in which order, control and discipline co-exist with resistance 
(to order), in the progressive constitution of modernity. Although Warren does not 
refer to Hetherington’s work, her borderzones may also be viewed as heterotopic for 
their ambivalent dimensions. Moreover, both aptly describe the Bruna bar of the 
early 1990s which harboured a nascent reggae scene. In this way, the case of 
reggae’s development in Bali supports Hetherington’s argument for the need to 
recognise the importance of ambivalent spaces in accommodating identity revisions, 
yet refrain from romanticising their subversive potential. Similarly, the Bruna reggae 
scene was marginal, but not necessarily transgressive or subversive. 
 
Nevertheless, ambivalent spaces can also be erased by developmentalist notions of 
progress. Lewis (1994) infers as much in his discussion of how sponteneity and 
trickery among the Jamaican Rastafarians were obliterated by a market logic. Warren 
(1998) also provides examples of how monologic modernity can obliterate Balinese 
magic-real domains’ heteroglossies. Similarly, the fate of the Bruna reggae scene is 
also revealing of the importance of refraining from over-estimating locals’ capacity 
to draw global media products into their own, self-determined identity practices. The 
fate of the Balinese reggae scene, like that of the graveyard Warren discusses, is 
testimony to the power of state discourses to obliterate such heteroglossies by 
physically transforming local landscapes, and hence the very tenuous position of the 
ambivalent spatial discourses that harbour identity revisions. 
 
The reggae graveyard 
Picard notes how, although Kuta was included as a designated tourism zone in the 
first development plan for Bali, its development “long remained anarchistic, without 
control or direction of any sort” (Picard, 1996: 77). In the 1970s, locals established 
small-scale ventures which accommodated foreign surfers who favoured the area’s 
local flavour over Nusa Dua’s resorts (see Neely, 1998). As argued above, 
enthusiasts’ accounts of changes in the reggae scene suggest that up until the 1990s, 
Kuta provided young Balinese men with a space on the fringes of local society; a 
margin or borderzone where liminal behaviour was sanctioned. After the investment 
boom, Kuta was transformed from a place where locals could mix freely with foreign 
tourists, to a playground for domestic tourists from Jakarta from which young local 
men were largely marginalised. 
 
Perfect Beat v6n4 January 2004: 3-27 
 
 15 
If previously, local enthusiasts had prided the Bruna scene’s influence over Jakartan 
rock bands, by the mid-1990s, the reggae scene was being ordered by ‘Big Capital’ 
commercial interests. Over the course of 1995, the Bruna scene underwent demise. 
This was probably less due to the institution of a Rp 10,000 a door charge - former 
vocalist with Legend, Frit, maintained that the charge was not applied to local 
regulars – than  the construction of a tarmac-ed esplanade which forced Bruna back 
from the shore. Frit maintained that the latter was more important in reducing 
Bruna’s accessibility to a broad variety of people, hence attesting to the importance 
of the beach as a borderzone which blurred distinctions between interiority and 
exteriority, hence helped maintained Bruna’s heterotopic qualities. Furthermore, in 
1996, Bruna was closed down after local police allegedly found that it did not have 
the proper licence (Tiga, 1996; Setelah, 1996; Diskotek, 1996; Di, 1996). 
Henceforth, the Balinese reggae scene became an annual festival in which bands 
competed for contracts in tourist bars, organised by the Nusa Dua based Tourism 
Academy, and sponsored by Waterbom Park, Hacket Bungee Jump, a Nusa Dua 
Hotel and Bali Hai day cruises. 
 
Bruna’s closure may not have had such dire consequences, had local reggae 
enthusiasts been able to move elsewhere. By that time, however, Kuta had been 
considerably transformed from the place it was in the late 1980s, when Sam and 
Rudi’s reggae parties had spawned a local fandom, to a kind of supercultural 
wonderland, replete with malls, plazas, multinational brand name clothing stores and 
fast food chains. Local night life also came to be dominated by such international 
chains, such as Hard Rock Cafe and Studebakers, and local youth were marginalised 
by the widespread introduction of cover charges. 
 
Kuta’s transformation, and its night life’s, can be seen as part of similar 
transformations of the whole island over the same ‘tourism boom’ period, during 
which the initial concept for the development of Bali’s tourism industry was 
effectively scrapped, and replaced with a more liberal, less regulative approach, 
locally referred to as ‘mass tourism’ (as opposed to cultural tourism). The original 
plan for Bali limited resort development to Nusa Dua in southern Bali and 
designated thirteen ‘stop-overs’ which tourists could visit on day trips or to stay at 
locally run homestays. The local bureaucracy adopted this concept, Cultural 
Tourism, which endeavoured both to protect Balinese culture from, and involve it 
in tourism. While the heart of the industry would be in south Bali, the ‘stop-overs’ 
theoretically allowed for other districts to partake in some of tourism’s projected 
benefits. In 1988, Bali’s third New Order Governor, Ida Bagus Oka, issued a 
decree that allowed for resort development in fifteen tourism zones located all 
over the island, and in 1993 a further decree which increased the number of 
tourism zones to 21 (Statistik Pariwisata, 1993; McCarthy, 1994). 
 
In this context, the aforementioned regionalist discourse was given focus by the 
emergence of opposition movements to two development projects in the early 
1990s. Firstly, a major Jakarta-based conglomerate, the Bakrie Group, made plans 
to construct a luxury resort (Bakrie Nirwana Resort: BNR), including a golf 
course, adjacent to an important temple, Tanah Lot, on the island’s south west 
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coast. Subsequently, in 1994 the local daily, the Bali Post, published a series of 
debates on the issue, and locals staged a number of street demonstrations, which 
protested the construction of the golf course and were “unprecedented since the 
1960s” (Suasta and Connor, 1999: 98; see also Warren, 1994; 1998). The second 
project included plans to construct a statue of the Garuda and a Hindu theme park 
-- a ‘megacomplex’ that was to dominate the heavily touristed southern peninsula. 
Citing the following letter to the Bali Post, Warren (1995: 387) describes an 
emerging environmentalism in Bali – “an attempt to resist the combined mega-
forces of Big Capital and Central Government in Indonesia of the Late New 
Order”: 
 
[It is] too big and will give the impression of overacting (…). Bali is small 
(…). Don’t… don’t have Bali’s future drowned with the coming of a statue 
which does not sit in harmony with an environment that is full of 
simplicity.(ibid: 382) 
 
 
Similarly, reggae enthusiasts who had been part of the earlier scene understood the 
closure of Bruna in 1996 in the context of the marginalisation of local entrepreneurs 
and other local interests, by the investment interests of the Suharto family and their 
associates, who were closely involved in the ‘booming’ Balinese tourism industry 
(Aditjondro, 1995). Indeed, it was rumoured that the five longstanding nightclubs to 
be closed down in 1996 were to make way for Jakartan competitors, and in October, 
1996, the governor of the province decreed that only five star hotels would be 
allowed to operate discotheques, in the interests of community order and safety 
(kamtibmas: keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat) (Diskotek, 1996; Buntut, 1996; 
Setelah, 1996). 
 
If previously, local enthusiasts had prided the Bruna scene’s influence over Jakartan 
rock bands, by the mid-1990s, the reggae scene was being ordered by ‘Big Capital’ 
commercial interests, such as the Nusa Dua based Tourism Academy, and sponsored 
by Waterbom Park, Hacket Bungee Jump, a Nusa Dua Hotel and Bali Hai day 
cruises, all of which sponsored the annual reggae ‘festival’ (Soul Rebel, Interview 16 
July 1998). Indeed, in the late 1990s, lomba (competitions) became a common mode 
by which the New Order state attempted to impose social order, as evident in other 
realms as well as the music scene. Warren, for example, refers to the ‘New Ordering’ 
of space in Bali by way of cleanliness competitions. In particular, she discusses the 
fate of the Ubud graveyard when subjected to one such ‘tidy town’ lomba, much to 
locals’ chagrin. She also cites this as an example of the impact of a “monologic” 
modernity upon “heteroglossic magic-real cultural domain”.  
 
As an illustration Gusti Ngurah was making about the great debates on 
globalization and modernity which currently raged, he pointed across the path 
and waving his finger with a mocking gesture said: ‘Look, can you believe it! 
Now we even have “lomba kuburan” [graveyard competitions]. Look at the 
result!’ Suddenly the blank uninterested expression on Ida Bagus Made’s face 
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was replaced with a fiery one and he joined in with a derisory tirade mixing 
anger and laughter. 
 …[The] gesture was too much for both of them. It was no longer ‘natural’ 
(alam), like a ‘hotel’, it had lost its aesthetic (kurang seni) and its magical 
enchantment (angker). 
Warren, 1998: 100 
 
In certain respects, the fate of Bruna’s borderzone was similar to that of the Ubud 
graveyard. For example, if Ubud locals critiqued the development of their graveyard, 
now seen as “no longer ‘natural’ (alam)”, many reggae enthusiasts lamented the loss 
Bruna’s cosmopolitan, inclusive space: 
 
Reggae has been commercialised. Many good musicians play in reggae bands, 
but there is no place for them, so they just play covers in the commercial 
sector. Bruna offered a place which was not commercial, because anyone 
could go there. Market demands are now withering away reggae musicians’ 
idealism. (Frit. interview with the author, 3 July, 1998) 
 
Nowadays, we are flooded with Jakartan culture. Jakartan people now 
determine our culture of leisure. (Agung Alit and Ngurah Karyadi. interview 
with the author, 25 June, 1998) 
 
Bruna was a far cry from the Hard Rock Café of today. It catered more to the 
lower classes. At Bruna, locals and Westerners came together. Bruna catered 
more for the lower classes than does Hard Rock Café. This is in line with the 
way in which people perceived the Rastafarian movement; that it was for the 
people. (Made Arthana. interview with the author, 4 October, 1998) 
 
[In comparison to Bruna], Hard Rock is too high class. Lower class people 
can’t go there. (Soul Rebel. interview with the author ,16 July, 1998) 
 
Further, if local Ubud bureaucrats successfully tamed the town’s ‘wild’ areas with 
concrete and walls, the reggae scene was similarly ordered. Now, beneath the 
auspices of the Tourism Academy, the bands competed for contracts in bars where 
they were to labour, as tourists’ entertainers.  
 
Other writers also provide examples of how marginal identities and spaces can 
become appropriated, subsumed beneath modernity’s trademark rationality. Lewis 
(1994) highlights elusion and trickery as an important subcultural strategy among 
Rastafarians -- he refers to the Rastas as tricksters who resist the codifying urges of 
modern society through ludic means. Lewis also draws attention to the way in which 
Rastafarians sought to profit from reggae’s international popularity, and improved 
their image in elite discourses of Jamaican identity, which now accepted the 
Rastafarians as authentic Jamaicans. Far from viewing this as evidence of 
Rastafarians’ empowerment, however, Lewis argues that their involvement in the 
tourist trade signaled the erasure of the Rastafarians’ characteristic trickery and its 
replacement with a rational modernity. 
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Ruddick’s observations of the correlations between marginal spaces and the emergence 
of novel identities among youth also recall the rationalization of the Balinese reggae 
scene following Bruna’s demise. She contends that the relative longevity of the 
squatting punk sub-culture in Hollywood “was partly due to the ready availability of 
condemned buildings for use and, initially, clubs to play in. But the erosion of quality 
marginal space and the transformation of the subculture went hand in hand” (Ruddick, 
1998: 349) 
 
The fate of the Balinese reggae scene attests, therefore, to the need to refrain from 
overestimating reggae’s polysemic capacities.  Like the Hollywood punks of which 
Ruddick (1998) writes, Balinese reggae fans retained ambiguous and marginal 
dimensions as long as enthusiasts could come together in a space approximating 
heterotopia, or borderzones. After the demise of the Bruna scene, playing reggae 
became unequivocally associated with an exchange value on the tourism industry’s 
labour market. This exchange value rested on musicians’ compliance with the 
industry’s demands (such as playing covers’ according to employers’ stipulations), 
and in this way contrasted an emerging regionalist discourse in which Balinese-ness 
was becoming aligned with increasing opposition to the industry’s new development 
direction. Nevertheless, those who aspired to or secured jobs on that market 
associated that exchange value with certain ‘essentially Balinese’ qualities, such as 
peace and relaxation, hence generating a new kind of reggae authenticity, which 
musicians highlighted by way of Othering ‘violent, un-Balinese’ thrash music. Other 
enthuasiasts, cited above, indeed lamented reggae’s so-called ‘commercialisation’, 
thus contested this new authenticity. In spite of such apparent contestations among 
enthusiasts, in the late 1990s, after the demise of the Bruna scene, reggae practice in 
Bali appears to have been notably recontextualised and, indeed, rationalised. 
 
Conclusion 
Reggae itself is polymorphous – and to concentrate on one component at the 
expense of all others involves a reduction of what are complex cultural 
processes. Thus, reggae is transmogrified American soul, with an overlay of 
salvaged African rhythms, and an undercurrent of pure Jamaican rebellion. 
Reggae is transplanted Pentecostal. Reggae is the Rasta hymnal, the 
heartcry of the Kingston rude boy, the nativised national anthem of the new 
Jamaican government The music is all these things and more – a mosaic 
which incorporates all the strands that make up black Jamaican culture; the 
call and response patterns of the Pentecostal Church, the devious scansion 
of Jamaican street talk, the sex and the cool of U.S. R and B, the insistent 
percussion of the locksmen’s jam sessions, all find representation in reggae.  
Hebdige (1973: 18) 
 
This essay has argued that Balinese reggae was indeed polymorphous. However, it 
was neither necessarily of oppressed people nor expressive of marginalization, as 
Hebdige’s description of Jamaican reggae’s component parts infer. In fact, in many 
respects, Balinese reggae enthusiasts’ unanimity on reggae’s ‘beachside, relaxing’ 
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nuances are suggestive of the scene’s roots in the kind of reggae Cushman describes 
as a commodity of the tourism industry. At the same time, I have argued, when 
commodified versions of Bob Marley symbology became drawn into local 
discourses, it presented young Balinese men with a margin where they fled in their 
quest to revise elite Balinese discourses of identity. Further, this margin happened to 
be effective in Bali  because the early reggae scene was spatially rooted at Bruna bar, 
which had distinct heterotopic qualities. 
 
Further attesting to its polymorphism, Balinese Bob Marley fandom was in part 
sparked by an Indonesian man whose dreadlocks brought him into contact with 
Rastafarians in England. Through them, he adopted the Rastafarian lifestyle and 
came into contact with reggae music which, in turn, on his return to Bali, acquainted 
him with a Bali-resident Jamaican, Sam, with whom he formed the island’s first 
reggae band. Rudi was not forthcoming on whether he saw reggae as linking him to 
other, similarly oppressed, ‘people of colour’, such as the English Rastafarians and 
Sam, so his encounters do not necessarily affirm O’Gormon’s contention that the 
reggae’s internationalization provided marginalized people with an expressive 
vehicle (O’Gormon, 1997). But Rudi’s recollections do attest to the Balinese reggae 
scene’s disparate roots. Reggae’s passage to Bali, that is, can be traced not only to 
the global tourism industry in which Bob Marley’s image and music came to be 
associated with tropical, beachside destinations, but also to more interpersonal 
encounters between Indonesians, Jamaicans and other Rastafarian communities 
abroad. Notably, Rudi stressed the coincidental nature of how his friendship with the 
Rastas was sparked. Such coincidences, nonetheless important in the eventual 
establishment of a Balinese reggae scene, suggest that the global dissemination of 
Rastafarian and reggae-related symbols may not always be as purposeful as much of 
the literature on the internationalization of reggae suggests. 
 
The later, festival-oriented scene may indeed be more unequivocally compared to the 
routinised versions to which Cushman refers. Unlike participants in the earlier scene, 
who valued reggae for its (perceived) capacity to create inclusive marginal spaces, 
those of the later scene valued reggae’s exchange value on the tourist bar circuit. 
Authenticity discourses of the later scene, which cast reggae as peaceful and orderly 
as opposed to thrash music, also contrast those of a broader, emerging regionalism 
which cast Balineness as authentically low and disorderly. These later scene 
authenticities nonetheless co-existed with images of Bob Marley in other spaces, 
beyond those of tourism, which were suggestive of their incorporation into local 
populist discourses. 
 
Balinese reggae’s refractive and polysemic dimensions in Bali therefore point to the 
importance of acknowledging the validity of all the abovementioned studies on 
reggae’s internationalisation. Based on the Balinese case, one could surmise that 
following its internationalisation under Blackwell’s Island Records, reggae music 
went on to serve a variety of ends. Both reggae and Rastafarian symbols were taken 
up in different ways, that is, by middle class American progressives, recording 
companies, Jamaican politicians, Rastafarians eager to profit from their newfound 
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positive image among tourists due to reggae’s international popularity, people of 
colour outside the Caribbean, and global tourism. 
 
9160 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 This essay is adapted from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which compares reggae, punk and 
death metal scenes in Bali, and which I undertook in the Politics Department at Monash University. The 
chapter was first revised in early 2003 with the assistance of a Monash University Publications Award, 
and again later in the year with the help of the Indonesian Mediations Program at Leiden University. 
2 In a feature article, Wolf (1993: 16) describes the young men who make a living by befriending single 
female tourists thus: 
In the tourist haven of Bali, and now in the neighbouring island of Lombok, you can find amongst the male youth 
a subculture whose peripheral yet lasting flirtation with the West has left them with a taste for drugs, alcohol 
and one night/one month relationships with tourist girls. They’re called variously ‘bad boys’, ‘Kuta cowboys’, 
‘gigolos’ (by other people) or ‘guides’ (their own term). 
3 Aside from Nilan’s (1996) analysis of Denpasar-based youth mnedia, Wiyata Mandala, and Parker’s 
(1992) study of Balinese primary school curricula, there is a dearth of academic studies on Balinese youth 
culture during the New Order period. My knowledge of local youth scenes around Kuta Beach derives 
mainly from interviews cited later in this chapter, conversation with locals, disparate journalistic accounts 
such as Wolf (1993) and Neely (1998), as well as my own investigations for regular profiles of Balinese 
surfers and the Balinese surf scene, published as part of a regular feature on the Balinese surfing scene in 
Bali Echo over the course of 1998-1999 (Baulch, 1999; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998e). 
4 Excorporation describes the process by which by which “the subordinate make their own culture out of 
the resources and commodities provided by the dominant culture” (Fiske in Lentini, 1999: 42). 
5 The Rastafarians’ Garveyist links are nonetheless tenuous, and White (1983: 8) claims that there is no 
evidence to suggest that Garvey ever prophesied the coming of a black King. Furthermore, White asserts, 
when Selassie rose to prominence, Garvey was highly critical of him, and pointed to his “imperial 
ineptitude” as the cause of Mussolini’s successful invasion of Ethiopia in 1934. White acknowledges that 
most Rastafarians saw Garvey as the founding father of their ‘new religion’. However, citing a Jamaica 
Times report of Garvey’s address to an UNIA convention in 1934, at which Garvey is said to have spoken 
of the Rastafarians “with contempt” (White, 1983: 8), White infers that Garvey did not see himself in this 
light. Furthermore, White (1983: 9) also argues for the importance of contextualising Rastafarianism in a 
“tradition  of messianic black mysticism that had been in full flower in Jamaica and elsewhere for some 
time” and, like Barrett, he stresses the seminal roles of the above-mentioned Hinkley, Hibbert, Dunkley 
and Hinds in devising, and soliciting support for, the ‘new religion’. 
6 Curiously, Regis makes no mention of Hebdige’s work of the previous decade (1973, 1979) in which he 
charts the progression of reggae from Jamaica to (similarly under-privileged) English West Indians.  As 
mentioned above, Hebdige argues that, in spite of Chris Blackwell’s role in reggae’s passage to England, 
English West Indians nevertheless took up reggae and practised it in subversive fashion, similar to its 
original Jamaican form. This, he surmises, exemplifies how deviant groups undertake cultural 
appropriation – “ways in which an increasingly alien environment could be conquered and invested with 
meaning” (Hebdige, 1973: 1). This directly contradicts Regis argument for cultural imperialism by re-
exportation, and his argument that reggae music helped West Indians in South London develop cultural 
autonomy is also at variance with Cushman’s argument for routinisation. 
7 The importance of hedonism and abandon to reggae symbology in these tourist areas directly contradicts 
Lewis’ (1994: 288) description of how “[I]n their deportment [the Rastafarians] purposely blurred the 
image of the black person as a happy-go-lucky quashie, and stood proudly in the rebellious ways of the 
beleaguered peasantry”. 
8 As far as I am aware, this song was never publicly performed.  
9 Eklof (1999: http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit57/pdi.htm)  notes the reception Megawati received 
when she opened the PDI’s fifth party congress in Bali in October 1998. In the lead up to the event, local 
youths’ allegiances to the PDI became demonstrably evident and led him to conclude that 
Megawati is able to benefit from her father's popularity because she has built a reputation for certain moral 
qualities of her own. Megawati's struggle against the New Order government boosted her reputation for 
justice,  righteousness, integrity and political courage. These are also qualities that Sukarno's name 
represents to those Indonesians who still hold the former president's name dear. Many people also tend to see 
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Megawati's struggle for justice against the New Order as an analogy to Sukarno's struggle for justice and 
independence against the Dutch in the 1930s. 
